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ORTHODOXIES  IN THE  STUDY  OF 
AGRARIAN  CHANGE 
By  ROBERT  H. BATES 
INTRODUCTION 
THE  purpose  of  this  paper  is to present  a critical  review  of  two 
major approaches  to  the  analysis  of  agrarian  societies,  and to  do so 
in light  of evidence taken from  the literature  on Africa.  The African 
data provoke considerable  skepticism  concerning  the validity  of these 
contemporary  orthodoxies  and support  the  following  three  major  counter- 
arguments. 
i. The very  traits  that  have caused these  societies  to be classified  as 
"precapitalist"-e.g., the  existence  of  common  land  rights;  the  avoidance 
of  market  exchanges;  the  turning  to  subsistence  production,  reciprocity, 
and such  social  institutions  as the  family  system  for  economic  support- 
are themselves  arguably  products  of  the  encounter  of  agrarian  societies 
with  agents  of  capitalism.' 
2. Agrarian  institutions  represent  compromises  and adaptations;  equally 
as often,  they  represent  impositions  from  above by  more powerful  ex- 
ternal agents. In either case, they  cannot represent  institutionalized 
expressions  of  agrarian  values;  subjectivist,  value-based  accounts  of  these 
institutions  are therefore  false. 
3. Not only  are the  current  orthodoxies  overly  culturally  determined; 
they  are also overly  economic.  Many  of  the  distinctive  traits  of  agrarian 
societies,  I argue,  result  from  the  efforts  of  the  state  to  secure  domination 
and control  over rural  populations.  Insofar  as the  institutions  and be- 
haviors  exhibited  by  agrarian  societies  define  a peasantry,  in short,  it  is 
the  state  that  creates  peasants. 
THE  DOMINANT  ORTHODOXIES 
Among  the  most  prominent  of  the  current  approaches,  two  stand  out: 
the  "natural  economy"  and "peasant  economy"  models  of  rural  society. 
I  By capitalism  I mean an economic  system  in which  there  exists:  (i)  market  exchange 
of  both  products  and factors  of  production;  (2)  in  particular,  private  markets  for  labor;  and 
(3) economic  accumulation,  thus  securing  the  reproduction  and expansion  of  the  means  of 
production. 
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THE  MYTH  OF  THE  NATURAL  ECONOMY 
The critical  elements  of  the  model  of  the  natural  economy  are  pre- 
sented  in  Table I. 
TABLE 1 
SCHEMATIC  PRESENTATION  OF  THE  MODEL  OF  A NATURAL  ECONOMY 
INITIAL  CONDITIONS 
1. Agrarian  economy 
2. Production  for  use rather  than  exchange 
3. Insignificance  of  markets 
INSTITUTIONAL  CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Communal  land rights 
a. Use rights  accorded  to producers  if,  and only  if,  pro- 
ducer  is a member  of  the  community 
b. Rights  to land revert  to community  when  use rights 
are no longer  exercised 
2. Importance  of the  primary  community  and, in particular, 
the  village 
SOCIAL  VALUES 
1. Self-sufficiency 
2. Status 
3. Equality 
PATTERNS  OF  CHANGE 
1. Initial  opposition  to "commoditization" 
2. Social disintegration  in the  face  of  markets 
3. Radicalization  under  the  impact  of  capitalism 
IMPLICATIONS 
The preference  of agrarian  societies  for  communal  forms  of 
economic  organization 
Initial conditions.  According to the model of the natural economy, 
"primitive"  agrarian  societies  produce  not  for  exchange  but for  use; as 
a consequence,  "market  exchanges  are usually  peripheral  [and] all im- 
portant  output  and factor  flows  are carried  on via reciprocity  and re- 
distribution."2  In the  absence  of  markets,  resources  are not  allocated  in 
accord with their  value in exchange; rather,  the  patterns  of allocation 
are determined  by social relationships.  As Dalton states,  "There is no 
separate  economic  system  to  be analyzed  independently  of  social  organ- 
ization."3 
2George  Dalton, "Traditional Production  in Primitive  African  Economies" in Dalton, 
ed., Tribal  and Peasant  Economies  (Garden City,  N.Y.: Natural  History  Press,  i967),  75. 
3George  Dalton, "Subsistence  and Peasant  Economies  in Africa,"  ibid.,  I57. 
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Institutional  characteristics.  Nowhere is the determining  influence  of 
social  organization  over  the  allocation  of  economic  resources  more  clearly 
seen than in the area of property  rights.  In precapitalist  societies,  ac- 
cording  to Marx, "an isolated  individual  could no more  own land than 
he could speak."4 The acquisition of property  is thus a social act; it 
requires  membership  in a community. 
Particularly  critical  is membership  in the village. Along with kin- 
based organizations,  the  village  is  viewed  as the  central  social  institution 
of  agrarian  societies.5 
The two themes  of communal restrictions  on landed property  and 
the  pervasive  significance  of villages  are often  fused.  They combine  in 
the  discussion  of  the  corporate  village.  In the  words  of  Eric Wolf,  such 
villages "maintain a measure of communal jurisdiction  over land ... 
restrict  their  membership,  maintain  a religious  system,  enforce  mecha- 
nisms  which  ensure  the  redistribution  or destruction  of  surplus  wealth, 
and uphold barriers  against  the  ...  outside."6  Although  the  initial  writ- 
ings  of  Wolf make it  clear  that  the  corporate  village  is but  one of  many 
forms  of  rural  settlement,  the  analysis  of  these  villages  dominated  much 
of  the  subsequent  literature  on agrarian  society.7 
Social values. The  social institutions  of rural society,  this  literature 
contends,  facilitate  the attainment  of basic cultural  values. One  such 
value is a  sense of membership.  Another is equality. A  third  is an 
outgrowth  of  the  first  two:  the  value  placed  on  guarantees  of  subsistence. 
All members  of society  possess  an equal right  to sufficient  income to 
guarantee their  survival.  "It is the absence of the threat  of individual 
starvation  which  makes primitive  society,  in a sense,  more  human than 
market  economy,  and at the  same time  less economic."8 
Patterns  of change.  The  initial  condition  of the natural economy  is 
said to  be the  absence  of  markets.  But,  according  to  this  model,  markets 
inevitably  penetrate  into  even the  most  isolated  communities;  and this 
alteration  in the initial  conditions  generates  characteristic  patterns  of 
change. 
4Karl Marx,  "Precapitalist  Economic  Formations,"  in Karl Marx and Friedrich  Engels, 
Pre-Capitalist  Socio-Economic  Formations:  A Collection  (London: Lawrence  & Wishart,  I979), 
98. 
5See,  for  example,  the  discussion  in James  C. Scott,  "Protest  and Profanation:  Agrarian 
Revolt  and the  Little  Tradition,"  Theory  and Society  4 (Summer  1977),  2I3. 
6 Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities  in Mesoamerica  and Central Java," 
Southwestern  Journal  of  Anthropology  I3  (Spring  I957),  6. 
7A  prime  illustration  would  be  Joel  S. Migdal,  Peasants,  Politics,  and  Revolutions  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  I974). 
8 Karl Polanyi,  quoted in James  C. Scott,  The  Moral  Economy  of  the  Peasant  (New Haven 
and London: Yale University  Press,  I976),  5. 
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One response  is to resist  the  market;  Robert  Redfield  maintains  that 
these  societies  attempt  to keep the  market  "at arm's  length."9  With the 
inevitable  triumph  of the market,  however,  a second response  arises: 
social disintegration.  Eric Wolf states  that  "capitalism  cut through  the 
integument  of custom,  severing  people from  their  accustomed social 
matrix  in order to transform  them  into  economic  actors,  independent 
of prior  social commitments  to kin and neighbors."Io  A third  response 
is rural  radicalism.  Agrarian  protest  is considered  radical in the sense 
that  it  asserts  the  entitlement  of  all people to  subsistence,  the  validity  of 
communal property  as a means of securing  this  entitlement,  and the 
rejection  of the  private  market. 
It is precisely  the  fact  that  peasants  and artisans  have  one foot  in the 
precapitalist  economy  that  explains  why  they  have provided  the  mass 
impetus  for  so many  "forward  looking"  movements.  Their  opposition  to 
capitalism,  based  as  it  is  on  a utopian  image  of  an  earlier  era,  is  as  tenacious, 
if  not  more  so,  as the  opposition  of  a proletariat  which  has  both  feet  in 
the  new  society." 
Policy  implications.  An important  implication  of this  theory  is that 
rural  dwellers  will  subscribe  to  collective  forms  of  economic  organization 
that  reject  private  property,  and thereby  forestall  the  emergence  of  eco- 
nomic inequality  and exploitation.  Goran Hyden notes that the pro- 
motion  of cooperative  societies  in Africa  derives  in part  from  the con- 
viction  of political  leaders that  African  rural  society  is communitarian 
by  preference.12 
THE  PEASANT ECONOMY 
A second  model of  agrarian  society  that  is frequently  applied to  rural 
Africa  is the  model of the  peasant  economy.  Its distinctive  features  are 
summarized  in Table 2. 
Initial  conditions.  Peasant  economies  are held  to  be precapitalist  in the 
sense that,  in peasant societies,  labor is not separated  from  the means 
of production. Nonetheless,  peasant societies  represent  a  more "ad- 
vanced" form  of agrarian society  than do natural  economies.  Peasant 
economies  do not stand isolated  and self-sufficient;  rather,  they  reside 
within  state  systems  and within  economies  that  contain  cities,  industry, 
and manufacturing.  They are linked to these other sectors  through 
relations  of political  domination  and economic  exchange. 
9  Redfield,  Peasant  Society  and Culture  (Chicago: University  of  Chicago Press,  I956),  46. 
-o  Wolf,  Peasant  Wars  of  the  Twentieth  Century  (New York: Harper & Row, i969),  279. 
II Scott  (fn.  5), 23 I - 
12  Hyden,  Efficiency  versus  Distribution  in  East  African  Co-operatives  (Nairobi:  East African 
Literature  Bureau, I973),  4. 
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TABLE 2 
SCHEMATIC  PRESENTATION  OF  THE  MODEL  OF  A PEASANT  ECONOMY 
INITIAL  CONDITIONS 
1.  Post-agrarian  economy;  importance  of  urban  industry  and 
manufacturing 
2. Fully  elaborated  markets  both  for  products  and  factors  of 
production 
3. Production  for  exchange  as well  as for  use 
INSTITUTIONAL  CHARACTERISTICS 
1.  Private  rights  in  land 
2. Prevalence  of  inequality 
a. State  coercion 
b.  Class  formation 
3.  Limited  participation  in  the  markets  for  products  and  labor 
BEHAVIORAL  CHARACTERISTICS 
1.  Subsistence  ethic 
2. Rejection  of  pure  profit  maximization 
PATTERNS  OF  CHANGE 
1.  Creation  of  the  peasant  mode:  impact  of  capitalism  on  the 
natural  economy 
2.  Conflicts  between  peasant  mode  and  capitalism 
Institutional  characteristics.  Nearly  all  discussions  of  peasant  economies 
emphasize  that  peasant  societies  are "part-societies."  In the  cultural 
sphere,  peasants  are bearers  of  the  "little"  tradition;  they  define  their 
rituals  in response  to  the  "great"  tradition  of  the  ritual  centers  of  the 
larger  society.'3  In the  political  sphere,  they  are  part,  but  not  governors, 
of  the  system.  Not  only  are  peasants  politically  subordinate  to  the  state, 
but  they  also  are  politically  dominated  by  other  classes,  which  are  often 
rural  classes:  in  the  context  of  a market  economy  and  with  the  help  of 
state  power,  certain  elements  of  the  rural  society  are  able  to  accumulate 
large-scale  private  landholdings.  This  pattern  of  inequality  is  so  impor- 
tant  that  Welch  asks:  "Without  ... landlords,  could  there  be  peasants?"'4 
In the  economic  sphere,  peasants  are  "part"  societies  in  the  sense  that 
they  participate  in markets  and are reliant  upon  them  to fulfill  their 
subsistence  needs  but  only  partially.  Limited  market  participation  exists 
where  there  is a tendency  to  consume  large  proportions  of  one's  own 
'3Redfield  (fn.  9), 46. 
'  Claude Welch,  "Peasants  as a Focus in  African  Studies,"  African  Studies  Review  20  (No. 
3,  I977),  2. 
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production  and to rely  primarily  upon family,  as opposed  to hired, 
labor.'5 
Behavioral  characteristics.  Peasants  are  held  to  exhibit  characteristically 
"precapitalist"  or  "non-market"  forms  of  behavior.  As  production  units, 
peasant  households  differ  from  profit-maximizing  firms  in  that  they  are 
driven  by  the  need  to secure  sufficient  subsistence  to  guarantee  their 
survival  and  their  reproduction.  As  a consequence,  they  will,  if  necessary, 
engage  in internal  exploitation  to  cover  the  requirements  of  domestic 
consumption.  They  will  work  longer  hours,  cultivate  the  lands  they  hold 
more  intensively,  or  surrender  greater  revenues  for  lands  they  wish  to 
buy  than  purely  commercial  considerations  would justify.'6 
Patterns  of  change.  The origins  of  peasant  economy,  it  is held,  lie  in 
the  impact  of market  forces  upon the  natural  economy.  Under  the 
stimulation  of  the  market,  property  rights  become  individualistic;  house- 
holds  are  no  longer  self-sufficient,  but  become  dependent  on  the  market; 
and "self-sufficient  communities  founded  largely  upon  kinship  ties  are 
'turned  outwards,'  as it  were,  and made  dependent  ...  upon  external 
structures  and  forces."'7  In the  third  world,  the  primary  agency  for  this 
expansion  of  the  market  is  imperialism.  Post  contends  that  "the  colonial 
powers  ...  greatly  extended  the  market  principle,  to  the  point  where 
the  impersonal  forces  of  the  world  market  dominated  the  lives  of  mil- 
lions....  It would  appear,  then,  that  many  of  the  conditions  for  the 
existence  of  a peasantry  were  suddenly  created,  but  from  outside."'8 
The subsequent  trajectory  of  change  in  peasant  societies  is  said  to  be 
largely  characterized  by  protracted  periods  of  conflict  between  capitalism 
and the  peasant  mode  of  production.  Some  scholars,  such  as Hyden, 
find  that  peasants  retard  the  growth  of  capitalism  by  their  tendency  to 
avoid  markets  and  by  their  preference  for  subsistence  production.'9  Others, 
such as Williams,  contend  that  peasants  resist  the  growth  of  capitalism 
but  nonetheless  fail,  for  they  are inherently  a "transitional  class,  which 
will inevitably  be displaced by the technical  superiority  of capitalist 
production."20 
sEric R. Wolf,  "Types of  Latin American  Peasantry:  A Preliminary  Discussion,"  Amer- 
ican  Anthropologist  57 (June  I955),  454. 
6 A. V. Chayanov,  Daniel Thorner,  Basile Kerblay,  and R.E.F. Smith,  eds.,  The Theory 
of  Peasant  Economy  (Homewood, Ill.: Richard  D.  Irwin for  the  American  Economic As- 
sociation,  i966). 
'  Ken Post,  " 'Peasantization'  and Rural  Political  Movements  in  Western  Africa,"  Archives 
Europe'ennes  de Sociologie  I3  (No. 2,  I972),  225-26. 
8Ibid., 233.  See also Wolf  (fn.  io). 
9 Goran Hyden,  Beyond  Ujamaa in Tanzania (Berkeley  and Los Angeles: University  of 
California  Press,  i980). 
20  Gavin Williams,  "The World Bank and the  Peasant  Problem,"  in Judith  Heyer,  Pepe 
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THE  MODELS  REVIEWED  IN LIGHT  OF THE  AFRICAN  EXPERIENCE 
As outlined  above,  the  foregoing  represent  two  of  the  dominant  models 
of  rural  society.  What is  devastating  is  how poorly  these  models  perform 
when applied to the  African  data. 
INITIAL  CONDITIONS 
To an Africanist,  one  of  the  most  striking  deficiencies  in  these  theories 
is posited  in their  initial  conditions:  a world of subsistence  production 
in which  there  are no markets,  no buying,  no trading.  This assumption, 
it  should be stressed,  cannot  be dismissed  as a mere  romantic  overtone 
in the  arguments;  rather,  it provides  an essential  underpinning.  Move- 
ments  away from  these  initial  conditions  precipitate  the  change from  a 
subsistence-oriented,  egalitarian,  isolated natural society  to a market- 
dependent,  class-riven,  peasant  society  that  is inextricably  tied  to  centers 
of  wealth  and power.  The initial  conditions  also help to  account  for  the 
growth  and behavior  of political  forces:  outrage  at the  loss of a "state 
of virtue"  provides  a demand for  agrarian  revolution,  and the moral 
values that  are threatened  through  the  spread  of  capitalism  provide  the 
revolutionary  ideology. 
If the  initial  conditions  of  the  model of  the  natural  economy  were to 
hold anywhere,  one would expect  them  to  hold in Africa.  And yet,  time 
and time  gain, historical  research  reaffirms  that  in precolonial  Africa 
there  was trade,  there  was commerce,  and there  was the  widespread  use 
of money in exchange economies.  Jack  Goody, who best summarizes 
these  findings,  is worth  quoting  at length: 
The  concept  of  non-monetary  economics  is  hardly  applicable  to  precolonial 
Africa,  except  possibly  for  certain  hunting  groups  of  minimal  importance. 
Africa  was  involved  in  a vast  network  of  wide-ranging  trade  long  before 
the  Portuguese  came  on the  scene.  For East  Africa  we have  a late  first- 
century  sailors'  guide,  the  Periplus  of  the  Erythrean  Sea,  to  the  trade  along 
the  coast.  Long  before  the  Europeans  arrived  there  were  trade  routes  from 
Madagascar  up the  East  African  coast,  through  the  Red  Sea and  into  the 
Mediterranean,  along the  Persian  Gulf  to India,  South-east  Asia,  and 
Indonesia.  By  the  time  the  Portuguese  had  reached  East  Africa,  the  Chinese 
had  already  been  active  there;  before  the  development  of  the  gun-carrying 
sailing  ship  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  the  maritime  commerce  of  the  Indian 
Ocean  made  western  Europe  seem  an underdeveloped  area.  Indeed,  the 
trade  between  Ethiopia,  the  Mediterranean,  and the  Indian  Ocean had 
much  to  do with  the  developments  in the  Arabian  peninsula,  including 
the  rise  of  Muhammed. 
Roberts,  and Gavin Williams,  eds.,  Rural  Development  in Tropical  Africa  (New York: St. 
Martin's  Press,  198I). 
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In West  Africa  the  medieval  empires  of  the  Niger  bend  were  built  up 
on  the  trade  which  brought  salt,  cloth,  and  beads  south  from  the  Sahara 
across  to West  Africa  and took  gold and ivory  and slaves  back  to the 
Barbary  coast  and from  there  into  medieval  Europe.21 
From  the  point  of  view  of  mercantile  economy,  parts  of  Africa  were 
similar  to  western  Europe  of  the  same  period.  Metal  coinage  was  in use 
on  the  East  African  coast.  In the  west,  currencies  consisted  of  gold,  brass, 
and  salt,  but  more  especially  cowrie  shells  which,  coming  as  they  did  from 
the  Maldive  Islands  off  the  south  of  Ceylon,  filled  most  of  the  necessary 
attributes  of  money.22 
Isolation,  subsistence,  and lack of  involvement  in an exchange  econ- 
omy  were  not  commonly  found  in the  "primitive"  economies  of  Africa. 
Where they  were,  these  traits  characterized  so small  and insignificant  a 
group  of  African  societies  that  it  would be nonsensical  to  base a general 
theory  of  social change upon them.23 
TRANSITION  ARGUMENTS 
The  reigning  orthodoxies  in the study  of agrarian economies are 
defined  not  only  in terms  of  their  initial  conditions;  they  are  also defined 
in terms  of their  dynamics  i.e., assertions  are made concerning  their 
characteristic  patterns  of change. Agrarian societies  are portrayed  as 
locked in conflict  with a powerful  alternative:  the capitalist  economy, 
where  private  property  exists,  where  everything  can be bought  and sold, 
and where  people are driven  to maximize profits  by  the  imperative  of 
market  competition.  In the face of the encroachment  of the capitalist 
economy,  rural  dwellers  are said to  attempt  to  keep the  market  at arm's 
length  and to resist  commoditization.  In light  of the  expectations  gen- 
erated  by these  arguments,  it is therefore  disconcerting  to find  that  in 
Africa  the roles  of the  supposed antagonists  are sometimes  the reverse 
of what these  models would lead us to expect. 
Buying  and  selling.  Despite myths  to the  contrary,  indigenous  peoples 
throughout  much  of  Africa  turned  quickly,  vigorously,  and skillfully  to 
production  for  colonial markets.  The rapid and astonishing  growth  of 
the cocoa industry  in West Africa  has been told by Hill and Berry; 
within  one generation,  Ghana became the  world's  leading producer  of 
cocoa; it  did so on the  initiative  of  indigenous  agrarian  interests.24  Ho- 
2 Jack  Goody, "Economy and Feudalism in Africa,"  The Economic  History  Review  23 
(December i969), 394-95. 
22Ibid., 395. 
23  There is evidence that  extensive  trade existed  in precolonial  Africa  for  agricultural 
products  as well. See William 0.  Jones,  "Agricultural  Trade Within Tropical Africa: 
Historical  Background,"  in Robert  H. Bates  and Michael  Lofchie,  eds.,  Agricultural  Devel- 
opment  in Tropical  Africa:  Issues  of  Public  Policy  (New York: Praeger,  i980),  10-45. 
24  Polly  Hill, Studies  in Rural Capitalism  in West  Africa  (London: Cambridge  University 
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gendorn  has  shown  how  in  Northern  Nigeria  indigenous  entrepreneurs 
organized  the  large-scale  production  of  groundnuts  for  export  to  colonial 
markets.25  Similar  histories  exist  for  palm  oil  production  in  Nigeria  and 
groundnut  production  in  Senegal.26  Giovanni  Arrighi  notes  that  in  the 
Rhodesias  change  was not  limited  to the  sphere  of  exchange  but  was 
also  introduced  in the  methods  of  production:  "Africans  were  equally 
prompt  in investing  and innovating  in response  to  market  opportuni- 
ties."27  The peasants acquired wagons, carts,  maize mills,  pumps,  ox- 
drawn  ploughs  and  other  equipment;  they  radically  altered  their  farming 
system;  and they  invested  in higher-grade  cattle  and the  fencing  and 
dips required  for  their  survival.28 
Property  rights.  Change  went  even  deeper:  it  extended  to  the  definition 
of  property  rights.  In light  of  the  expectations  formed  by  the  orthodox 
treatment  of  agrarian  change,  the  stunning  irony  of  the  matter  is that 
it  was  often  the  governments  of  the  colonial  powers the  primary  agents 
of capitalism who advocated  "communal"  property  rights,  whereas 
members  of  the  indigenous  agrarian  societies  championed  the  cause  of 
private  ownership. 
In order  to  avoid  confusion  on the  matter  of  property  rights,  let  me 
recall  the  definition  outlined  in Table i.  By  communal  land  rights,  I 
mean  a system  wherein 
i. Use  rights  are  accorded  a producer  if,  and  only  if,  that  producer  is 
a member  of  the  community.  In other  words, 
(a) Community  membership  is  a sufficient  condition  for  rights 
to  land:  no  member  of  the  community  can  go  without  land. 
(b) Community  membership  is  a necessary  condition  for  rights 
to  land:  land  cannot  be  alienated  outside  of  the  community. 
2.  The community  holds  revisionary  rights  in land.  That  is,  when 
individuals  no  longer  use  the  land,  rights  to  it  revert  to  the  community. 
The  land  can  then  be  reallocated  to  other  users. 
Press,  I970);  Sara Berry,  Cocoa,  Custom  and  Socio-Economic  Change  in  Rural  Western  Nigeria 
(London:  Oxford  University  Press,  I975). 
25 Jan  S. Hogendorn,  "Economic  Initiative  and African  Cash Farming,"  in  Peter  Duignan 
and Lewis H. Gann, eds.,  Colonialism  in  Africa,  1870-1960 (London: Cambridge  University 
Press,  I975),  283-328. 
26 Donal Cruise  O'Brien,  The  Mourides  of  Senegal  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  I971);  G. K. 
Helleiner,  Peasant  Agriculture,  Government,  and Economic  Growth  in Nigeria  (Homewood, 
Ill.: Richard  D. Irwin,  i966). 
27 Arrighi,  "Labor Supplies in Historical  Perspective:  A Study  of Proletarianization  of 
the  African  Peasantry  in Rhodesia,"  in Giovanni  Arrighi  and John  S. Saul, Essays  on the 
Political  Economy  of  Africa  (Nairobi: East African  Publishing  House, I973),  I85. 
28 See also the  cases  described  in Robin  Palmer  and Neil Parsons,  eds.,  The  Roots  of  Rural 
Poverty  in Central  and Southern  Africa  (Berkeley  and Los Angeles:  University  of  California 
Press,  I977). 
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Under a system  of private  property  rights,  membership  in the  com- 
munity  is no longer  sufficient  to guarantee  access to land; nor is it a 
necessary  condition.  Thus, land can be alienated  to persons  outside  the 
community.  Moreover,  land that  is not in use does not revert  to the 
community;  it can be held for  purposes  of speculation,  transferred  to 
other  private  individuals,  or  bequeathed  to  persons  of  the  owner's  choos- 
ing.  It  is  a consequence  of  this  system,  of  course,  that  even  in  the  presence 
of  abundant  land,  people may  starve  for  want  of  access  to  it;  a primary 
attraction  of a communal system  of land rights  is that  under similar 
circumstances  such deaths  would not  occur. 
Conflicts  between capitalist  governments  committed  to communal 
rights  and spokesmen  for  agrarian  societies  committed  to private  land 
rights  broke out in both West and East Africa.  In  I9I2,  the British 
colonial government  appointed  the  West African  Lands Committee  to 
investigate  land laws in British  West Africa.  The Committee's  report 
called for  the reinforcement  of "pure native tenure."  It stressed  that 
"legislation should have as its aim the checking of the progress  of 
individual tenure  and the strengthening  of native  custom,"  which,  it 
held, "did not recognize  the  concept  of individual  tenure  and forbade 
the ...  sale of ...  community  land."29  In these  recommendations,  the 
Committee  was vigorously  opposed by local interests.  One expert  on 
local practices,  Sir Brandford  Griffith,  noted that  in opposing private 
ownership  and a free  market  in land,  the  government  was in fact  flying 
in the  face  of "local custom."  Grier  comments  that 
So definite  and  so common  a practice  was  the  sale  of  land  ...  by  the  end 
of  the  nineteenth  century  that  Griffith  (whose  association  with  the  colony 
dated  back  to  his  father,  Sir  William  Brandford  Griffith,  Governor  i886- 
I895)  could  say  that  he "never  had  occasion  to  consider  the  question."30 
In West Africa,  then,  the putative  agency  of capitalist  expansion- 
the government  of the colonial power-actively promoted  communal 
rights,  while members  of the agrarian societies  demanded the unre- 
stricted  right  to purchase  and to  alienate  land. In East Africa,  a similar 
"reversal"  obtained.  In opposition  to the  penetration  of  private  market 
forces  into  the  rural  sector,  for  example,  the  postwar  governor  of  Kenya, 
Sir  Philip  Mitchell,  argued  that  soil  degradation,  environmental  spoilage, 
29 Beverly  Grier,  "Underdevelopment,  Modes of Production,  and the State  in Colonial 
Ghana," The  African  Studies  Review  24  (March  i981),  35. For an excellent  discussion  of  the 
issue of property  rights,  see also John  Cohen, "Land Tenure and Rural Development  in 
Africa,"  in Bates  and Lofchie  (fn.  23). 
3? Grier  (fn.  29),  33. 
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and avaricious  exploitation  of  land  inevitably  followed  the  creation  of 
private  property.  What  was needed,  he maintained,  was "the  proper 
control  of  the  community.  Each Native  Land Unit,  or  a portion  of  a 
unit,  was  to  be  regarded  as an 'estate  of  the  community';  each  occupier 
of  land  was  to  be a 'tenant  of  the  tribe'."3' 
The indigenous  people  opposed  the  land  policy  of  the  government  of 
Kenya.  As long  ago as 1912,  a Kenya  District  Officer  had  investigated 
local  tenurial  practices  among  the  Kikuyu  and  had  found  that  land  was 
held  by  families  who occupied  it  unconditionally-that  is,  not  at the 
pleasure  of  any  higher  communal  authority.  He had also found  that 
many  of these  family  estates  had been  purchased.  Land was in fact 
bought  and sold  both  within  and between  tribes.32  It is therefore  not 
surprising  that  the  Kikuyu  opposed  the  government's  policy  and de- 
manded  individual  registration  of  land  holdings  and the  enforcement 
of  private  rights  to  land.  The urgency  with  which  they  pressed  their 
demands  was  of  course  intensified  by  the  insecurity  they  felt  in  the  face 
of  the  uncompensated  seizure  of  lands  by  the  colonialists. 
Characteristically,  the  transition  arguments  of  the  orthodox  models 
of  agrarian  change  have  made  the  assumption  that  rural  dwellers  are 
assaulted  by  capitalism.  They  counterpoise  the  communal  attributes  of 
these  societies  against  the  forces  of  capitalism  that  promote  private  in- 
terests.  They make  allowance  for  some  members  of rural  society  to 
demand  private  property  rights:  rural  elites,  for  example,  are  expected 
to seek  a regime  of private  property  rights  in order  to defend  their 
economic  privileges.  But  it  could  never  be  the  case  under  these  theories 
that  agents  of  capitalism  would  seek  to  establish  communal  rights  while 
the  members  of  agrarian  societies  seek  private  ones.  And  yet,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  literature  on Africa  documents  at least  two  instances  of  this 
"reversal." 
Our attention  is thus  deflected  from  the  economist  orthodoxies.  In 
particular,  the  discordant  set  of  facts  suggests  that  governments  may  act 
in ways  that  differ  from  what  one  would  expect,  given  their  societies' 
"stage  of  development";  they  may  confront  an  independent  set  of  political 
imperatives. 
Ideology.  In the  case  of  the  British,  there  existed  a genuine  conviction 
that  precapitalist  societies  were  communitarian;  that  Western  man,  in 
the  personage  of  the  imperialist,  was  introducing  forces  that  promoted 
self-interested  behavior;  and  that,  because  indigenous  institutions  were 
3 Quoted in M.P.K. Sorrenson,  Land Reform  in Kikuyu  Country  (Nairobi: Oxford  Uni- 
versity  Press,  i967),  56. 
3-2Ibid,  20-2I. 
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scarce  and  inherently  valuable,  they  should  be  protected  by  government. 
In his  discussion  of  Norman  Humphrey,  an influential  figure  in the 
postwar  development  of  Kenyan  land  policy,  Sorrenson  notes: 
Humphrey-and  indeed  a good  many  other  officials-doubted  the  moral 
right  of  Europeans  to  impose  ... a system  [of  economic  individualism] 
on  Africans,  thus  destroying  the  supposed  communal  spirit  of  tribal  tra- 
dition.  Humphrey  wanted  to  establish  a series  of  locational,  divisional, 
and  district  councils  to  manage  land  along  communal  lines  ... and  he 
hoped  this  would  lead  to  a 'reawakening  of  [the  individual's]  sense  of 
duty  to  his  fellows  and  his  land  and  the  instilling  of  a desire  to  abandon 
those  false  values  that  have  been  a major  product  of  his  sudden  contact 
with  our  civilization.'33 
Humphrey  was,  of  course,  echoing  the  sentiments  of  far  more  pow- 
erful  figures  in  the  British  colonial  regime:  Lugard,  Cameron,  Perham, 
and  Hailey,  to  mention  but  a few.34 
Empowerment.  Tactical  calculations  made  in the  course  of  securing 
political  domination  in Africa  were  also  important.  The colonial  gov- 
ernments  sought,  and  needed,  political  allies  through  whom  they  could 
secure  control  over  Africa's  largely  agrarian  population.  A prime  reason 
for  insisting  on communal  land rights,  it would  appear,  was that  a 
system  of  communal  rights  empowered  locally  based  confederates:  it 
gave control  over  the  allocation  of the  key  resource  in an agrarian 
economy  to  those  who  would  govern  the  agrarian  population  on  behalf 
of  the  colonialist  powers-the  tribal  chiefs. 
In  the  British  case,  the  policy  of  governing  through  "traditional  rulers" 
was known  as "indirect  rule."  C. K. Meek  clearly  articulates  the  link 
between  indirect  rule  and the  formation  of  property  rights;  at the  be- 
ginning  of  his  semi-official  treatise,  Land  Law  and  Custom  in  the  Colonies, 
he  states: 
The authority  of  chiefs,  sub-chiefs  and  heads  of  clans  and  families  is 
bound  up  with  the  land.  The  grant,  therefore,  to  individuals  of  absolute 
rights  of  ownership  would  tend  to  disrupt  the  native  policy,  and  so,  too, 
would  the  indiscriminate  sale  of  tribal  lands  by  chiefs.35 
So compelling  is this  thesis  that  Meek  returns  to  it  toward  the  end 
of  his  work,  contending  that  "there  is a political  danger  in allowing 
33Ibid.,  58. 
34See, for example, Lord Hailey, An African  Survey:  Revised,  1956 (London: Oxford 
University  Press,  I957);  Frederick  D. Lugard, The  Dual Mandate  in British  Tropical  Africa 
(London: F. Cass, i965);  and Margery  Freda Perham,  Native  Administration  in Nigeria 
(London:  Oxford  University  Press,  I937). 
35  Meek,  Land Law and Custom  in  the  Colonies  (London: Oxford  University  Press,  I949), 
IO. 
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individuals  to become  owners  of  'freeholds,'  without  owing  any  alle- 
giance  to  the  local  Native  Authorities."  He concludes,  "If  'indirect  rule' 
is  to  continue  to  be  a cardinal  principle  of  British  policy,  it  would  appear 
to  be essential  that  the  local  Native  Authorities  should  remain  the  ul- 
timate  'owners'  of  as much  land  as possible.  ..."36 
The  best  system,  from  Meek's  point  of  view,  was  one  in  which  political 
loyalty  to  an agent  of  the  colonial  power  served  as a prerequisite  for 
access  to land.  Robert  L. Tignor,  in examining  the  operation  of  this 
system,  finds  it to  operate  roughly  as one would  expect.  Friends  and 
relatives  of  the  chief  secured  land;  indeed,  the  chiefly  families  became 
the  richest  land  owners  in  the  districts  studied,  while  political  enemies 
of  the  chiefs  lost  rights  to  land.  Tignor  also  notes  that  the  more  valuable 
the  control  over  land-i.e., the  scarcer  the  land  in  relation  to  the  pop- 
ulation-the  greater  the  power  which  the  British  policy  of  customary 
land rights  conferred  to the  chiefs.  The Ibo and Kikuyu  chiefs,  for 
example,  who  ruled  in  densely  populated  agricultural  areas,  proved  far 
more  effective  as  "modernizing  agents"  of  the  British  than  did  the  chiefs 
of  the  Kamba  or Masai,  who  lived  in areas  where  population  was far 
less  dense  and  land  therefore  relatively  more  abundant.37 
Counter-factual  observations-that  rural  dwellers  favor  private  prop- 
erty  rights  while  capitalist  governments  favor  communal  property- 
have thus  driven  us to a departure  from  orthodox  theories  of rural 
change.  We have  moved  instead  to an approach  in which  key  rural 
institutions-in  this  case,  property  law-are interpreted  as  political  out- 
comes.  As a corollary  to  this  approach,  it  might  be assumed  that  the 
institutions  that  were  adopted  in  any  particular  situation  would  represent 
the  outcome  of  political  bargaining.  Viewed  in this  light,  there  is no 
particular  reason  to  expect  one  or  another  form  of  agrarian  institution 
to  emerge  as  a consequence  of  social  change.  The  outcome  would  depend 
on the  configuration  of  power. 
This  inference  is  supported  by  the  literature.  In  some  areas  of  Africa, 
both  the  colonial  powers  and the  native  chiefs  were  notably  weak.  In 
Zambia,  for  instance,  the  occupying  forces  were  small  and  chiefly  powers 
had  been  based  largely  upon  warfare  and  slave  raiding,  both  of  which 
were  abandoned  following  the  imperial  occupation.  It was  also  true  in 
Kenya;  not  only  were  the  British  forces  small  in  number,  but  acephalous 
36  Ibid.,  I93. 
37  Tignor, "Colonial Chiefs  in Chiefless  Societies,"  Journal  of  Modern  African  Studies  9 
(I97I),  350.  See also Marshall  Clough,  Chiefs  and  Politicians:  Local Politics  and  Social Change 
in Kiambu,  Kenya,  918-rq936,  Ph.D.  diss.  (Stanford  University,  I978). 
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societies  were the rule-the  institution  of chieftaincy  was nonexistent. 
From the point of view of the colonial administration  in both places, 
the  result  was a need for  power. In the  case of Kenya,  the  response  of 
the  British  was the  virtual  creation  of  chiefs  and tribal  authorities,  and 
the  assignment  of  the  power  to regulate  the  allocation  of  "native"  lands 
to these  native  authorities.  In the case of Zambia, the British  forbade 
any  registering  of  individual  titles  of  land ownership,  and created  tribal 
rights  in land; land allocation  became the responsibility  of the chiefs. 
As Gluckman states,  government  policy  promoted  tribalism.38 
Where there  was a need to  create  rural  power,  then,  the  colonial  state 
promoted  the  establishment  of  communal  property  rights  as part  of  its 
effort  to elaborate systems  of rural political  control  over an agrarian 
population.  Where the  colonial authority  possessed  decisive  power and 
was not reliant  upon the  creation  of rural  elites,  the  situation  was dif- 
ferent.  In essence,  it  was no longer  purely  political;  commercial  consid- 
erations  could be decisive.  For example,  if  an industrial  labor  force  was 
needed, the agrarian society  could be "proletarianized,"  as it was in 
some regions of southern  Africa. Where food or export  crops were 
desired,  the rural  population  could be left  in place as a free  peasantry 
and agrarian  society,  a collection  of  smallholders  working  virtually  within 
a regime  of private  property. 
In other regions,  where rural elites did exist,  the outcome of the 
bargaining  between the colonial power and the indigenous agrarian 
society  often  reflected  the  composition  and preferences  of  the  latter.  In 
Ghana, for  instance,  indigenous  commercial  elites  profited  from  the  use 
of  land. Exports  of  rubber,  timber,  and palm oil had long  flourished  in 
the territory,  and the local political leaders themselves  were deeply 
involved  in commerce  and trade.  The colonial power,  in securing  the 
terms  of the political  settlement  by which to govern  the territory,  had 
to  concede  the  rights  of  these  rural  elites  to  exercise  unrestricted  control 
over their  property.  In Uganda, by contrast,  the rural elite was not 
commercialized,  and land was not  exploited  to secure  pecuniary  profits 
from  agriculture.  Rather,  the  elite  was almost  purely  political  and con- 
sisted  of the chiefs  and their  administrators.  In order to secure allies 
within  the  rural  sector,  then,  the  imperialists  had to  accommodate  them- 
selves to this  structure  of power. The result  was yet  another  form  of 
property  settlement:  the  virtual  "Junkerization"  of  landed relations.  In 
return  for  their  collaboration  with the British  occupying  powers,  the 
38Max  Gluckman, "Foreword" to W. Watson, Tribal Cohesion  in a Money  Economy 
(Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press  for  the  Rhodes-Livingstone  Institute,  I958),  x-xi. 
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chiefs  were  given  freeholders'  rights  to  the  best  lands  in Uganda;  the 
peasants  virtually  became  serfs.  When  cash  crop  production  began,  the 
chiefs  reaped  vast  economic  benefits  through  the  appropriation  of  labor 
dues  and  other  "feudal"  services.39 
The argument  that  African  indigenous  societies  embodied  collective 
property  rights  and that  it  was the  influence  of  capitalism  that  led to 
the  formation  of  private  rights  in  land  is  an  overly  economist  one.  Rather, 
the  form  of  property  law  was  shaped  by  the  desire  of  the  colonial  state 
for  political  domination  of  an  agrarian  population  and  by  the  nature  of 
the  political  accommodations  it had to make in order  to secure  its 
hegemony. 
Finances.  States  that  are driven  by the  need for  domination  thus 
develop  land  rights  in  efforts  to  create  rural  centers  of  power.  In  shaping 
their  policies  toward  rural  property,  their  behavior  is  also  influenced  by 
financial  imperatives.  One of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  influence  of 
fiscal  considerations  comes  from  Zambia.  As is well known,  Zambia 
depends  on  the  production  of  copper.  The copper  deposits,  first  located 
early  in  the  20th  century,  gave  birth  to  one  of  the  world's  leading  copper 
industries;  by  I930,  the  mines  of  what  was then  Northern  Rhodesia 
employed  30,000  people.  As the  largest  industry  in  this  small  territory, 
and  by  a vast  measure  the  most  profitable,  the  copper  industry  constituted 
the  major  element  in  the  colonial  government's  tax  base. 
When  copper  prices  rose,  both  the  government  and  the  mining  com- 
panies  prospered;  when  copper  prices  fell,  both  suffered.  But  the  costs 
imposed  by  lower  prices  were  borne  unequally:  while  both  the  govern- 
ment  and  the  firms  experienced  decreasing  revenues,  the  efforts  of  the 
firms  to  lower  their  costs  when  income  declined  imposed  increased  costs 
upon  the  government. 
The mines  were  capitalist  enterprises.  When  prices  fell,  they  maxi- 
mized  their  profits  (or,  equivalently,  minimized  their  losses)  by  curtailing 
their  use  of  the  variable  factor  of  production:  labor.  While  it  was  cost- 
minimizing  on  the  part  of  companies  to  release  labor  at  times  of  lower 
prices,  unemployed  labor  threatened  to  add to  the  costs  of  government. 
These  costs  might  take  the  form  of  the  state's  providing  food  and  shelter; 
or  they  might  take  the  form  of  police  protection  in  the  face  of  threats 
posed  by  masses  of  unemployed  workers.  Even  though  both  the  gov- 
ernment  and  the  mining  companies  derived  their  revenues  from  mining, 
then,  the  government's  need  for  additional  funds  increased  just  when 
revenues  became  most  scarce. 
39  Henry  W. West,  Land Policy  in  Buganda  (London: Cambridge  University  Press,  I972). 
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This fiscal  dilemma was, in a sense,  created  by  capitalism.  Since the 
means of production  were in private  hands,  production  decisions  were 
made solely  with  a view to private,  as opposed to social,  consequences. 
In addition,  the state's  revenues  were subject  to cyclical  shocks origi- 
nating from  the capitalist  economies. L.  H.  Gann quotes the Chief 
Secretary  of Northern  Rhodesia at the  time  of the  most  cataclysmic  of 
these  shocks-the  depression  of  the  I930s: 
The wealth  of  the  country  is in  the  minerals  which  it  does  not  own  ... 
and direct  revenue  from  this  source  is  at  present  negligible....  The fact 
...  that  the  companies  are  not  earning  taxable  profits  does  not  diminish 
the  services  which  the  Government  is  compelled  to  supply  to  the  mining 
areas.40 
To deal with  this  dilemma,  the  state  advocated  an ironical  solution: 
the  development  of  communal  forms  of  rights  to landed property.  The 
government  created  a form  of  citizenship  in  which  rights  were  dependent 
not only on national membership,  but also on membership  in a sub- 
nationality,  a tribe.  Access  to  land became  a function  of  tribal  affiliation. 
Land could be acquired in a rural community  by affiliating  with its 
political  officials  and by establishing  membership  in a kin group that 
belonged  to that  political  community.  To retain  rural  land rights,  then, 
urban dwellers  had to be "tribalized." Rural lands could not be sold; 
they  were retained  as "tribal  trusts."  The reason  for  these  policies  was 
clear:  at times  of  fiscal  stress,  the  government  wanted  to  be able to  avoid 
the  costs  of large-scale  unemployment.  It wanted the  disbanded urban 
labor force  to reincorporate  itself  into the rural  economy  quickly  and 
peacefully.  The costs  of  guaranteeing  subsistence  were  thus  to  be borne 
by  the  rural  community.4I 
Thus, the origins  of communal land rights  lay at least as much in 
capitalism  and in the  fiscal  problems  it  created  for  the  state  as they  did 
in the  inherent  cultural  traditions  of  the  rural  population.42 
40  Gann,  A History  of  Northern  Rhodesia  (London: Chatto  & Windus,  i964),  253. 
4-  Excellent  discussions  are included  in Elena L. Berger,  Labour,  Race and Colonial  Rule: 
The  Copperbeltfrom  1924 to  Independence  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1974);  Charles  Perrings, 
Black Mineworkers  in Central  Africa  (New  York: Africana  Publishing  Company, I979); 
A. L. Epstein,  Politics  in  an Urban  African  Community  (Manchester:  Manchester  University 
Press  for  the  Rhodes-Livingstone  Institute,  I958);  and Helmuth  Heisler,  Urbanization  and 
the  Government  of  Migration  (New York: St. Martin's  Press,  I974). 
42 For additional  arguments,  see  Claude Meillassoux,  Maidens,  Meal  and  Money:  Capitalism 
and the  Domestic  Community  (London: Cambridge  University  Press,  i98i);  Harold Wolpe, 
"Capitalism  and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa,"  Economy  and Society  I  (No. 4, 
1972),  425-56;  and Palmer  and Parsons  (fn.  28).  I differ  from  these  approaches  in my 
acknowledgement  of the  divergence  of interests  between  the  state  and private  enterprises, 
and in  my  conviction  that  the  state  was set  upon  solving  its  own  fiscal  problem  by  controlling 
the  formation  of  land laws. 
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ANOTHER  INSTITUTION:  THE  VILLAGE 
Thus far  I have employed  the  African  data to  criticize  several  major 
components  of the currently  orthodox  theories  of agrarian change- 
their  statement  of  initial  conditions;  their  specification  of  characteristic 
trajectories  of change; and their  analysis  of a key  agrarian  institution, 
property  rights.  The African  experience  provokes  a skeptical  reappraisal 
of  arguments  pertaining  to  a second  major rural  institution,  namely,  the 
village. 
In Africa,  village dwelling was often  not the basic form  of rural 
settlement;  many  people preferred  to  live  in  isolated  homesteads.  Where 
villages  were  formed,  it  was often  at the  behest  of  states.  Many  of  these 
states  were profoundly  capitalist. 
At the time of the establishment  of the Pax Britannica  in north- 
eastern  Rhodesia,  for  example,  people  generally  resided  in family  home- 
steads. In the late i9th century,  however,  the British  South African 
Company (B.S.A.C.)-the  creation  of  that  most  dedicated  proponent  of 
capitalist  expansion,  Cecil John  Rhodes-determined that  the region's 
rural  population  properly  belonged  in villages.  George Kay notes  that 
"throughout  the  whole  of  north-eastern  Zambia ruthless  regrouping  for 
administrative  convenience  was systematically  carried  out."43  He quotes 
from  the  B.S.A.C.'s own records  that  "many ...  resisted  and were sent 
to prison  before  the order was finally  obeyed."44  In this  area, then,  it 
was the  administrators  who sought  to  form  the  villages.  That the  agents 
of  one of the  most  dedicated  embodiments  of  capitalism  were the  pro- 
ponents  of villagization  adds an ironic  note to our reappraisal  of the 
orthodox  position.45 
Even today  it would appear that  village  dwelling  is preferred  by  the 
governments  rather  than  by  the  rural  people.  Tanzania is  a notable  case 
in point.  In the  name of "development,"  the  government  of Tanzania 
has sought  to group rural  dwellers  into  communities  large  enough for 
it to provide dispensaries,  clinics,  schools,  water supplies,  agricultural 
inputs,  marketing  facilities,  and  other  services;  it  thereby  hopes  to  strengthen 
the productive  forces  of the country's  agrarian  society.46  It is notable 
that  the  state  legitimated  its  reconstruction  of  rural  society  by  propound- 
43 Kay,  Social  Aspects  of  Village  Regrouping  in  Zambia  (Lusaka: Institute  for  Social  Research, 
University  of  Zambia, i967),  II. 
44Ibid.,  I  O. 
45 In the case of Kenya, Sorrenson  notes:  "The Kikuyu did not  live in villages,  but in 
dispersed  households.  ...  During the Mau Mau Emergency  the Kikuyu,  the Embu and 
some of  the  Meru population  were  concentrated  in  732  villages...."  Sorrenson  (fn.  30),  3. 
46 The best  studies  are Michaela Von Freyhold,  Ujamaa Villages  in Tanzania (New York 
and London: Monthly  Review  Press,  I979);  Dean E. McHenry,  Jr.  Tanzania's  Ujamaa  Villages 
(Berkeley:  Institute  of  International  Studies,  I979);  and Hyden (fn.  i9). 
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ing a theory  of African  agrarian history  in which "colonialism [had] 
encouraged  individualistic  social attitudes,"47  whereas  prior  to colonial- 
ism, Africans  had lived cooperatively  in socially  integrated,  mutually 
supportive,  "village communities."  Tanzanian  scholars  have not hesi- 
tated  to question the  validity  of these  claims.48 
In evaluating  the  presumption  that  village-living  is the  natural  form 
of  agrarian  settlement  in Africa,  we should  be disposed  toward  caution. 
In some areas,  villages  appear not to have been the  preferred  mode of 
habitation.  In other  cases,  where they  were  preferred,  it was the states 
that  preferred  them.  Some of these  states  were socialist,  as in the case 
of Tanzania;  in the case of the late British  South Africa  Company, 
however,  the  authorities  were rampantly  capitalist.49 
A BEHAVIORAL  CHARACTERISTIC:  THE  PREFERENCE  FOR  SUBSISTENCE 
The three  elements  of  initial  conditions,  institutional  traits,  and char- 
acteristic  patterns  of change help to define the orthodox  models of 
agrarian  society.  So, too,  does a fourth  element:  the  psychological  traits 
of  rural  dwellers.  Of these  traits,  the  one that  is central  to the  conven- 
tional  models is the  preference  for  subsistence  production. 
In contradistinction  to the  conventional  orthodoxies,  I argue that  the 
reversion  to  subsistence  can  be viewed  as a rational  response  to  prevailing 
conditions  in the  political  and economic  environment  of the  rural  pro- 
ducers.  The actions  of the states  that  control  the  markets  in efforts  to 
extract  resources  from  rural  populations  constitute  an important  source 
of  these  conditions. 
Many of Africa's  export  crops  are cash crops,  pure and simple; they 
have  no direct  use in  consumption  and are grown  purely  for  the  market. 
Recently,  the  volume of agricultural  exports  from  Africa  has declined, 
creating  shortages  of foreign  exchange; this  decline has been taken by 
Hyden and others  as evidence  of  the  disruptive  power  of  a precapitalist 
peasantry.50  But I would argue that  it should be viewed in a different 
light. 
In Africa  as a whole, over 8o percent  of the population  is engaged 
in agriculture,  and over 50 percent  of the gross domestic  product  is 
derived  from  agricultural  production.  Most  African  states  therefore  rely 
47Ibid.,  98. 
48 See, for  example,  Samuel S. Mushi, "Modernization  by Traditionalization:  Ujamaa 
Principles  Revisited,"  Taamuli I (No.  2, March  I971). 
49 For further  evidence  concerning  "state  origins"  of  village  communities  and a brilliant 
exposition  of  this  argument,  see Samuel L. Popkin,  The  Rational  Peasant  (Berkeley  and Los 
Angeles:  Unversity  of  California  Press,  I979). 
5? Hyden  (fn.  i9). 
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on agriculture  for  financial  resources.  One way in which the industry 
can  be  taxed  is  by  regulating  the  market  for  export  crops.  In  many  cases, 
the  government  is the  sole  legal  buyer  of  these  crops.  By  purchasing 
them  at  an  administratively  set  price  in  the  domestic  market  and  selling 
them  at prices  prevailing  in the  world  market,  the  government  accu- 
mulates  revenue  generated  by  the  difference  between  the  domestic  and 
world  market  prices.  In  this  way,  the  producers  of  cash  crops  are  heavily 
taxed.5' 
One implication  of  such  governmental  fiscal  policies  is that  the  re- 
wards  for  participating  in  the  market  place  are  lowered  for  many  farm- 
ers;  they  are  certainly  lowered  in  comparison  with  the  returns  attained 
by  producing  crops  that  can  be consumed  on the  farm  or  sold  outside 
of  official  marketing  channels.52 
A government's  use  of  market  controls  to  levy  resources  from  agri- 
culture  thus  lowers  the  returns  farmers  can  expect  from  production  for 
the  market,  both  in  absolute  and  relative  terms.  In  and  of  itself;  this  fact 
would  account  for  the  peasants'  turning  away  from  cash  crop  production. 
There  is  therefore  no  need  to  posit  the  existence  of  an  antimarket  peasant 
mentality.  Indeed,  such  an imputation  would  be wrong:  withdrawal 
from  exchange  is the  appropriate  market  response  to the  economic 
conditions  that  at  present  characterize  many  agricultural  markets. 
THE  MARKET  ORIGINS  OF POLITICAL  BONDAGE 
Governments  are  interested  not  only  in  securing  public  revenues  from 
export  markets;  they  are  also  interested  in securing  foreign  exchange. 
Toward  this  end,  they  tend  to  overvalue  their  currencies.  One conse- 
quence  is  the  taxation  of  export  agricultural  products  for  the  benefit  of 
those  who  seek  imports:  the  industrialists  (who  seek  cheap  imports  of 
plant  and capital  equipment)  and the  elites  (who  seek  to  gratify  their 
tastes  for  imported  products  more  cheaply).  Another  consequence  of 
overvaluation  is the  generation  of political  power  by  establishing  an 
excess  demand  for  foreign  exchange.  At  the  artificially  pegged  price  of 
the  domestic  currency,  the  market  cannot  allocate  foreign  exchange;  the 
demand  for  it  exceeds  the  supply.  Those  in charge  of  the  foreign  ex- 
change  "market"  therefore  become  enormously  powerful  because  they 
control  the  allocations  of  a scarce  and  valuable  resource. 
In  this  system,  the  beneficiaries  are  those  in  the  Central  Bank  or  those 
who  make  appointments  to  it.  They  are  members  of  the  foreign  exchange 
5 See Robert  H. Bates,  Markets  and States  in Tropical  Africa  (Berkeley  and Los Angeles: 
University  of  California  Press,  i98i). 
52 See,  for  example,  the  data  contained  in  Government  of  Uganda,  Ministry  of  Agriculture 
and Forestry,  "Pricing  Policy  and Agricultural  Production,"  (Entebbe: Ministry  of Agri- 
culture  and Forestry,  August  I978). 
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allocation  committees  and of  the  committees  that  allocate  import  licenses, 
or persons who designate the appointees  to these committees.  Those 
who receive  import  licenses  also stand  to benefit. 
The losers  in this  system  are those  who are not located in positions 
of access to this scarce resource  and who nonetheless  must purchase 
imported  goods. Typically,  there  are no peasant  farmers  in the  Central 
Bank or on the committee  that  allocates foreign  exchange or import 
licenses.  Yet the  farmers  rely  on imports.  Farm implements  such  as hoes, 
cutlasses,  sprayers,  pesticides,  ox ploughs  and other  tools,  sacks  and bags, 
milling  machines,  and so forth  often  have to be imported.  Moreover, 
many  consumer  goods,  such  as shirts,  shoes,  blankets,  soap,  and batteries 
are imported,  or are manufactured  with  imported  equipment.  But, in 
this  administratively  structured  market,  the  farmers  must,  in  effect,  bribe 
their  superiors  to secure  needed imports;  they  must  pay the premium 
exacted by the excess demand for  foreign  currencies  and imports  to 
satisfy  those who have sufficient  political  power to secure privileged 
access to foreign  exchange  or to the  imports  it  can buy. 
Overvaluation  thus  lowers  the  price  of  exports,  increases  the  costs  of 
farming,  and raises  consumer  prices  for  farmers.  And it does so while 
involving  the  farmers  in  a system  of  regulated  foreign  exchange  markets 
in  which  they  are  subject  to  political  and economic  domination  by  persons 
with  influence  in the  national  capital. 
An analysis  that  is based on the political  manipulation  of markets 
thus reveals  three  features  of the conventional  models of precapitalist 
societies.  One is the  withdrawal  from  markets;  another-a  virtual  cor- 
ollary-is  the preference  for  subsistence;  and the third  is the power- 
lessness  of  peasants.  Rather  than  posit  these  characteristics  as three  sep- 
arate traits,  I regard them  as joint consequences  of the way in which 
markets  have  been  manipulated  by  states  to  extract  resources  from  agrar- 
ian societies.  The  approach is more powerful  than the conventional 
orthodoxies.53 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have summarized two of the dominant  models of 
agrarian  change and reviewed  them  in light  of evidence drawn from 
rural  Africa.  The traditional  approaches  require  initial  conditions  that 
53 Catherine  Coquery-Vidrovitch,  in writing  about precolonial  African  societies,  defined 
the  African  mode of production  as one in which  states  did not  directly  control  producers 
(e.g., through  enserfment  or slavery),  but controlled  and manipulated  trade in order to 
accumulate resources  from  them.  Her analysis  is at least as applicable,  in my view, to 
contemporary  Africa  as it  was  to  the  precolonial  period,  and  very  likely  more  so.  See Coquery- 
Vidrovitch,  "Recherches  sur  un mode de production  Africain,"  Le Petisee  I44  (i969),  6i-78. 
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have  rarely  existed  historically.  They  are  overly  subjectivist,  attributing 
the  existence  of  institutions  to  preferences  under  circumstances  in  which 
these  institutions  have  clearly  been  imposed.  Moreover,  they  are  overly 
economic,  in that  they  place  too  strong  an emphasis  on the  impact  of 
the  market  on agrarian  societies  and  too  little  on the  impact  of  states. 
Time  and  again  throughout  this  essay,  an  approach  has  proved  fruitful 
that  looks  at  the  effect  upon  rural  society  of  the  demand  for  power  and 
resources  on the  part  of  states  under  conditions  in which  people  and 
wealth  are  concentrated  in  agriculture. 
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